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This article discusses in broad
outline the principal devices that
can be utilized to allocate control
and management powers in a close
corporation. Its objective is to give
an overall view of these control
schemes and provide "idea guides"
on how they can be used in setting
up control patterns for close corpo-
rations.
A few of the arrangements dis-
cussed may be of doubtful validity
in some states. The fact that a de-
sired control mechanism is not
available under a local law may
be a factor for the attorney to weigh
in determining whether to incorpo-
rate in some other state, e.g., under
the Delaware corporation statute
or under the progressive and well-
drafted new Michigan statute.
CLASSIFICATION OF STOCK
In most states, provision can be
made in a corporation's articles of
incorporation for several classes
of shares with different voting
power, rights to dividends, rights
on liquidation, and other qualities.
A class of shares can be made non-
voting, or its voting rights can be
made to vary according to the ques-
tion under consideration. Thus, a
class of shares can be given the
right to vote only for the election
of directors, or on amendments to
articles of incorporation, or on
other fundamental corporate ac-
tion. Furthermore, provision can
be made for votes on some types
of action to be by shares and on
other types of action to be by
classes.
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article appeared, in a somewhat different version, in 30 BENCH
& BAR OF MINNESOTA 19 (September 1973), published by the Minnesota State Bar
Association.
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By varying the voting powers,
dividend rights, and other qualities
of the several classes of stock and
by using different combinations
in allocating shares of the various
classes, almost any desired control
arrangement can be achieved.
An interesting question exists
under the law of some states as to
whether use can be made of a class
of stock with voting power but no
proprietary rights; that is, a class
of stock which gives the holder the
power to vote but does not bestow
any right to dividends or to share
in the assets on dissolution. An
Illinois case upheld, without the
aid of a specific statutory provision,
a class of shares with voting power
but no proprietary rights. Stroh v.
Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48 Ill.
2d 471, 272 N.E. 2d 1 (1971).
In an interesting Delaware deci-
sion, Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del.
Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (Sup. Ct.
1966), a corporation was owned
by two families, the Lehrmans
and the Cohens. It originally had
two classes of stocks, a class A-
L stock held by the Lehrmans and
a class A-C stock held by the
Cohens. Each class of stock elected
two of the four directors. Because
of the fear of deadlock-past ex-
perience in the company indicated
that corporate paralysis was likely
-the shareholders amended the
corporation's charter to create a
third class of stock, consisting of
a single share with a ten-dollar par
value, which entitled the holder to
elect a fifth or deadlock-breaking
director. That share of stock was
issued to the company's attorney.
He became the "swing man," able
to break an impasse between the
two families. His share of stock,
however, was callable by the cor-
poration on the vote of four of the
five directors, which meant that
the Lehrmans and the Cohens
could eliminate him by redeeming
his share of stock. The share of
stock carried no proprietary rights,
except the right to recover ten dol-
lars on redemption of the share of
stock or on dissolution of the cor-
poration. The court upheld this
deadlock-breaking arrangement.
Incidentally, the attorney, when
this litigation ended, was the com-
pany's chief executive officer.
Class Voting for Directors
In most states, stock can be clas-
sified and provision made for each
class to elect a director or a speci-
fied number of directors. Then a
separate class of stock or a majori-
ty of the shares of a class of stock
can be issued to each shareholder.
Hence, if each member of a four-
man company wants to be assured
of representation on the board, four
classes of stock, identical in all
respects except that each class
elects a different director, can be
issued, one class to each share-
holder. The number of directors
elected by a class can be varied by
providing, for example, that the
class of stock held by one share-
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holder can elect two directors,
while another class owned by
another shareholder can select
three directors. An arrangement
under which all of the shares of a
class are issued to a single person
facilitates estate planning, because
he can dispose of almost half of his
stock without losing the power to
choose a director.
Where there are two groups of
shareholders, each wanting a veto
over director action, a board with
an even number of directors can
be created and each group given
a class of stock with power to elect
half of the board.
Class voting for directors is in
a sense inconsistent with a share-
holder's right to vote his shares
cumulatively for directors. Com-
pare Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d
78, 126 N.E. 2d 701 (1955), with
Humphrys v. Winous Co., 72 Ohio
L. Abst. 65, 57 Ohio Op. 44, 125
N.E. 2d 204 ( (Cuyahoga County,
1956), rev'd 165 Ohio St. 45, 133
N.E. 2d 780 (1956). Therefore,
if class voting for directors is to be
used, a provision should be in-
cluded in the articles of incorpora-
tion expressly stating that share-
holders in the corporation do not
have the right to vote cumulatively.
The effect of classification of
a corporation's stock and provision
for class voting for directors on the
corporation's ability to elect the
tax status provided by Subchapter
S of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954 (IRC) should be consid-
ered. Broadly speaking, a corpo-
ration that elects Subchapter S tax
status is not subject to federal tax
on its income; instead, its income
or losses are considered for tax
purposes to be the income or losses
of its shareholders. IRC §§1371-
1379. Among the requirements for
eligibility to elect Subchapter S
status is that the company have
only one class of stock. The Regu-
lations provide, however, that
where several groups of shares are
identical except that each group
has a right to elect a proportionate
number of directors, the corpora-
tion will be treated as having only
one class of stock for Subchapter S
purposes. Treas. Reg. §1.371-1(g)
(1966). Thus, if a corporation is-
sues four identical classes of stock,
each with 100 shares and each able
to choose one director, those four
classes will be considered as one
class for Subchapter S purposes.
Similarly, if a corporation has two
classes of stock with identical
characteristics, except that one
class with 100 shares outstanding
selects one director and a second
class with 200 shares outstanding
elects two directors, that arrange-
ment also meets the one-class re-
quirement of Subchapter S. It is
probably possible, without losing
Subchapter S eligibility, to parcel
out the shares of a class so as to
give one shareholder slightly over
half of the stock in that class and
thus power to elect a board mem-
ber, but issue the other shares in
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the class to shareholders who own
other stock and are capable of
electing different directors in order
to give them additional participa-
tion in dividends and in assets on
dissolution.
An arrangement for class voting
for directors needs to be shielded
against modification by amendment
of the articles of incorporation.
Protection should also be provided
against an increase in the size of
the board of directors, and against
the issuance of additional stock
within a class that may reduce
the holder of a majority of the
shares to a minority holder of that
class.
. Some states may provide, as
does Minnesota, that articles of in-
corporation -may confer upon the
creditors of the corporation, or
upon a class or classes thereof, the
right to vote to the extent and sub-
ject to the limitations stated there-
in." Minn. Stat. Ann. §301.26(12)
(1969). On occasion, creditors, or
a particular class of creditors like
debenture holders, may be given
power to vote on corporate deci-
sions.
HIGH VOTINC AND
QUORUM REQUIREIENTS
Well-informed businessmen ac-
quiring a minority interest in a
close corporation usually want
protection against the power of
majority shareholders to make uni-
laterally fundamental changes in
the corporation by amendment of
the articles of incorporation, merg-
er, and other action, and to control
corporate management through
election of the board of directors.
The principal of majority rule is
splendid, unless you own 40 per-
cent of the stock of a close corpo-
ration while someone else owns 60
percent. A minority shareholder
typically wants a veto over some,
perhaps all, important corporate
decisions. A person coming into
a close corporation in a minority
position may have sufficient bar-
gaining power, because the corpo-
ration badly needs his services,
patents, or other assets, to obtain
the consent of majority share-
holders to setting up a veto arrange-
ment.
In most states, a veto over
fundamental corporation action
can be accomplished by requiring
unanimity or a high vote for share-
holder action. Corporation statutes
usually require shareholder ap-
proval for amendment of the arti-
cles of incorporation, merger or
consolidation, sale or disposition
of all or substantially all corporate
assets other than in the usual and
regular course of business, and vol-
untary dissolution. Thus, a clause
in the articles of incorporation re-
quiring unanimity for shareholder
action on these matters gives each
shareholder an effective veto over
these basic corporate changes.
Similarly, a provision requiring ap-
proval by the holders of a high per-
centage of the shares can be used
30
January
1974 CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS 31
as well to assure a veto, as long
as the requirement is protected
against circumvention by the issu-
ance of additional stock.
In most states, power to prevent
changes in officers or employees,
in salaries, or in the day-to-day
conduct of the business can be
given to a shareholder by requiring
unanimity or a high vote for direc-
tor action and coupling that pre-
requisite with an arrangement that
insures the shareholder representa-
tion on the board of directors.
Representation on the board of
directors can usually be assured
a minority shareholder by:
* Executing a shareholders' agree-
ment permitting him to designate
a director;
e Requiring cumulative voting for
the election of directors; or
* Classifying the shares, provid-
ing for election of some directors
by one class of shares and other
directors by a second class of
shares and giving him all or a
majority of one class of stock.
To guard against possible board
action while the shareholder's posi-
tion on the board is vacant because
of the death or resignation of his
representative, a clause can be in-
serted in the articles of incorpora-
tion prohibiting board action until
the vacancy has been filled. See,
e.g., Strong v. Fromm Labora-
tories, Inc., 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.
2d 389 (1956) (bylaw barred di-
rectors from transacting business
while vacancy unfilled).
Perhaps a slight doubt exists
whether, absent explicit statutory
language, a provision requiring
unanimity of the shareholders, as
distinguished from the concurrence
of holders of a large proportion of
the shares, would be held valid for
these corporate actions. See Sellers
v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons, Co.,
23 Del. Ch. 13, 26, 2 A. 2d 108,
114(1938).
Where a statute does not spe-
cifically authorize a high vote re-
quirement for some shareholder
action, e.g., the election of direc-
tors or approval of voluntary liqui-
dation, but specifically permits it
for other actions by sharehold-
ers, the argument can be made
that, in validating greater-than-
majority requirements for specified
shareholder action, the legislature
must have intended to disapprove
higher than usual vote require-
ments for other shareholder action.
See Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel,
294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E. 2d 829
(1945) (invalidating, under a form-
er New York statute, high vote
requirements for shareholder and
director action.)
In some states, if a shareholder
cannot be assured representation
on the board, he can be given a
veto over matters ordinarily within
the province of the board of direc-
tors, as the selection of corporate
32 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER (Vol. 20-No. 1)
officers, by transferring certain
decision-making powers in those
matters from the directors to the
shareholders and then requiring
unanimity for shareholder action.
In other states, the statutes that
confer powers on the directors are
phrased in mandatory terms and
seemingly do not contemplate pro-
visions in the articles transferring
to the shareholders powers that
are normally within the province
of directors. See, for example,
Minn. Stat. Ann. §301.28(1)
(1 969)-"The business of a corpo-
ration shall be managed by a board
of directors."
As a rule, high vote requirements
for shareholder and director action
are preferable to high quorum re-
quirements or to a combination of
high quorum and high vote require-
ments. If high quorum require-
ments are used, "§hareholders and
directors must be protected against
their inadvertent attendance at a
meeting that is to consider action
they oppose. Thus, the high quorum
requirement must be buttressed by
a requirement that notices of
meetings state the business that is
to be transacted. Otherwise, a
shareholder or director may attend
a meeting, help form a quorum,
and thereby permit action on a
matter which he opposes.
Furthermore, the protection fur-
nished minority shareholders by
high quorum requirements for di-
rectors' meetings may be illusory,
because courts may decree that di-
rectors are under a duty to attend
meetings and cannot refuse to be
present in order to block action to
which they object. In a New York
case in which a director deliberate-
ly stayed away from a board meet-
ing in an effort to preclude the
other two directors from filling a
board vacancy with another repre-
sentative of their faction, the New
York Court of Appeals-in a high-
ly questionable decision-held that
the absent director and a share-
holder supporting his acts, who
together owned 50 percent of the
corporation's stock, were estopped
from claiming that the board's ac-
tion in filling the vacancy was in-
valid because taken at a meeting
at which a quorum was not present.
The court commented that "they
may not now complain of an ir-
regularity which they themselves
have caused." Gearing v. Kelly,
I 1 N.Y. 2d 201, 203, 182 N.E. 2d
391, 227 N.Y.S. 2d 897, 898
(1962).
Many lawyers apparently be-
lieve that the use of both high
quorum and high vote requirements
sets up a double hurdle that objec-
tionable action must clear before
it can become operative. Actually,
this double obstacle is an illusion.
If a shareholder or director re-
frains from attending a meeting in
order to prevent the formation of
a quorum, he, of course, never gets
an opportunity to veto a proposal
by voting against it. In most states
it is preferable to rely solely on a
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high vote requirement. This permits
shareholders or directors in ap-
parent disagreement to get together,
discuss their differences, and pos-
sibly discover areas of agreement
or evolve policies satisfactory to
all.
In those jurisdictions where high
vote requirements for director or
shareholder action may be of
doubtful validity, it is, of course,
prudent to "backstop" high vote
requirements with high quorum
provisions. But see Berkowitz v.
Firestone, 192 So.2d 298 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1966), where the
court held that bylaws prescribing
a high vote requirement for share-
holder and director action were
invalid, inter alia, because the
statute which authorized high
quorum requirements did not au-
thorize the imposition of high vote
requirements.
A widely used method of pro-
viding a veto over important action
by officers, including the drawing
of checks and borrowing of money,
is for the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws to require for the
execution of checks, promissory
notes, and other important docu-
ments, the signatures of two or
more officers, each representing
a different shareholder or faction
of shareholders. A variation of this
type of arrangement limits a cor-
porate officer's authority to act to
a relatively small dollar amount
or short period of time, unless he
obtains the approval of another
officer or the consent of the board
of directors.
The limitations and disadvan-
tages of high vote requirements
must not be overlooked:
* They provide a veto and no
more; they do not enable minority
shareholders to determine policy
affirmatively and to go forward
with its execution.
* They deprive the corporation
of the flexibility it may need to
adjust to unexpected business
situations.
* Even if all the shareholders can
be expected to act in good faith,
the presence of veto arrangements
increases the chance that a dead-
lock will occur in the corporation's
management that will paralyze the
corporation.
e High vote requirements may
place an unscrupulous shareholder
in a position to extort unfair con-
cessions from the other share-
holders in return for his approving
beneficial corporate actions.
In deciding whether to use high
vote requirements, therefore, the
lawyer must weigh the need to
protect the interests of minority
shareholders against the desirabil-
ity of retaining that freedom of
action which is beneficial to the
corporation and the shareholders
as a group.
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SPECIAL INCORPORATION
OR BYLAW CLAUSES
Inclusion of "optional" provi-
sions in the articles of incorpora-
tion and special provisions in the
bylaws can often be useful in tailor-
ing the control pattern of a corpo-
ration. Most statutes clearly sanc-
tion such provisions. The ALl-
ABA Model Business Corporation
Act, for example, permits a cor-
poration's articles of incorporation
to include "Any provision, not in-
consistent with law, which the
incorporators elect to set forth in
the articles of incorporation for
the regulation of the internal af-
fairs of the corporation, including
any provision restricting the trans-
fer of shares and any provision
which under this Act is required
or permitted to be set forth in the
by-laws." ALI-ABA Model Bus.
Corp. Act §54(h) (Rev. 1969).
The bylaws "may contain any
provisions for the regulation and
management of the affairs of the
corporation not inconsistent with
law or the articles of incorpora-
tion." ALI-ABA Model Bus. Corp.
Act §27 (Rev. 1969).
A lawyer may find useful
clauses that:
. Broaden the shareholders' rights
to inspect books and records and
gain access to information about
corporate affairs;
* Define and strengthen the share-
holders' preemptive rights, which
can be a valuable protection to
shareholders of close corporations,
though they are a source of irrita-
tion in public-issue corporations;
e Impose restrictions on the trans-
ferability of the corporation's
stock;
* Provide for arbitration or other
procedures for settling disputes or
resolving deadlocks;
9 Require an increase in dividends
when compensation of executives
is increased; or
* Otherwise control the corpora-
tion's dividend policies.
Other special article of incorpo-
ration or bylaw clauses undoubtedly
will occur to resourceful and ener-
getic draftsmen grappling with
particular business problems.
SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS
Perhaps the most frequently
used control device in close corpo-
rations is a shareholders' voting
agreement or some other share-
holder contract allocating control
and management powers among
the participants. All the share-
holders, or only some, holders of
a majority of the shares or owners
of a substantial minority interest,
may enter into an agreement
among themselves to assure that
they continue to act together in
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making decisions concerning
corporate affairs.
Whenever all the shareholders
are to become parties to an agree-
ment, minority shareholders usu-
ally want to be assured member-
ship on the board of directors or
the power to select one or more
directors, some voice in the man-
agement of the corporation, and
protection against the power vested
in the majority by the principle of
majority rule. Holders of a con-
trolling interest may be willing
to share their control in order to
bring into the enterprise persons
whose money, skills, or business
connections are badly needed, and
who otherwise would not buy a
minority interest in a close corpo-
ration.
Management matters most often
covered by a shareholders' agree-
ment are the following:
o How the shares of parties to the
agreement are to be voted in elec-
tions of directors;
o Who are to be the officers of the
corporation;
o Long-term employment arrange-
ments for some or all of the par-
ticipants;
o The salaries to be paid share-
holder-employees;
o The amount of time each par-
ticipant must devote to the busi-
ness, and whether he is to be
privileged to engage part time in
other activities;
e The power of one or more of the
participants to veto corporate
decisions;
* The circumstances in which
dividends are to be declared; and
* A way of resolving corporate
disputes, through an arbitration
provision or by some method for
dissolving the corporation in the
event of dissension or deadlock
among the shareholders or direc-
tors.
The validity of shareholders'
agreements, especially those that
purport to regulate matters which
are normally within the province
of the board of directors, has fre-
quently been challenged. Contracts
that encroach on the power of the
directors, by designating corporate
officers and other key employees
and fixing the salaries to be paid
them, or specifying the circum-
stances under which dividends
may be declared, have met with
highly variable and inconsistent
treatment.
Many decisions have laid down
the principle that the shareholders
cannot by agreement bind them-
selves to select a board of directors
that will consent to be "dummies."
"Clearly the law does not permit
the stockholders to create a steril-
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ized board of directors," was the
pithy comment of the New York
Court of Appeals in Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 323, 119
N.E. 559, 562 (1918). On the
other hand, a significant number
of decisions, including many re-
cent ones, have sustained agree-
ments deciding important matters
of corporate policy and thus taking
away from the directors a sub-
stantial part of their normal de-
cision-making power. Many of the
contracts upheld have designated
persons to occupy corporate offices
or fixed the corporation's dividend
policy.
In some of the decisions there
are suggestions that the validity
of shareholders' agreements lim-
iting the powers of directors may
turn on the number and impor-
tance of the functions taken from
the directors, and on the extent
to which the agreements deviate
from the statutory norm giving
corporate management to the
directors. For a discussion of the
authorities, see F. O'Neal, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE §§5.16-5.20 (Callaghan, Chi-
cago, 2d ed. 1971).
Whenever the holders of all, or
almost all, of a corporation's
shares are parties to a contract,
modern courts are disposed-and
properly so-to uphold it even
though it affects important powers
of the directors.
Most of the modem corporation
acts contain specific provisions
dealing with the validity of share-
holders' agreements. Even where
the local statute is silent on the
subject, courts are inclined to up-
hold a shareholders' agreement
that has a proper business purpose
even though it encroaches to some
extent on directors' powers. In
Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23
N.W. 2d 375 (1946), a shareholder
was induced to lend large sums of
money to his floundering corpo-
ration. An agreement among the
holders of a majority, but less than
all, of the corporation's shares
provided that the corporation
would not declare dividends until
it repaid the shareholder loan.
Some of the corporation's share-
holders brought suit, claiming that
the agreement was invalid because
it divested the corporation's direc-
tors and officers of the right and
duty to exercise independent judg-
ment and discretion in deter-
mining corporate policy and action.
The court upheld the agreement,
stating:
"it is not the province of courts
to emasculate the liberty of con-
tract by enabling parties to escape
their contractual obligations on
the pretext of public policy unless
the preservation of the public wel-
fare imperatively so demands. . ..
The practical conduct of a modern
business corporation compels a
frank recognition that an agree-
ment by a number of stockholders
to combine their votes in order to
effectuate a particular policy is not
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of itself unlawful in the absence
of evidence of an intent to defraud
the other stockholders or to secure
a private benefit at the expense of
the corporation or the other stock-
holders.'" Id. at 75 and 78, 23
N.W. 2d at 379 and 380.
Voting Trusts
The voting trust is not just a
"big business" instrument, as is
sometimes supposed. It is a flexi-
ble device that can be very useful
in working out control arrange-
ments in a close corporation.
Shareholders may create a vot-
ing trust by entering into a trust
agreement and transferring title
to their shares to voting trustees
who, in turn, issue certificates of
beneficial interest, usually called
"voting trust certificates," to the
shareholders. The trustees then
vote the shares in accordance with
the terms of the trust agreement.
Holders of a majority of the
voting shares in a close corpora-
tion can use the voting trust in-
stead of a voting agreement as a
device for consolidating their
voting power and assuring that
their shares will be voted as a unit.
A voting trust may be selected
because it is self-executing, while
specific performance of a share-
holders' agreement might not be
available and, in any event, would
involve risks and delays. On the
other hand, a voting trust may have
some disadvantages in some states,
where, by statute, voting trusts
may be in effect for a limited
number of years, or must be open
to inspection by shareholders.
Minnesota, for example, fixes the
maximum duration of a voting
trust at 15 years, unless it was
created in connection with a corpo-
rate indebtedness, when it may
extend through the period of in-
debtedness. Minn. Stat. Ann.
§301.27 (1969).
Irrevocable Proxies
The parties to a shareholders'
agreement, instead of binding them-
selves to vote their shares as a unit
or in accordance with a predeter-
mined plan, sometimes relinquish
their power to vote, and confer it,
in the form of an irrevocable
proxy, upon one or more of their
number or upon some person not
a party to the agreement. A proxy
may facilitate the implementation
of a voting agreement and avoid
the possibility that a suit for spe-
cific performance, with the atten-
dant uncertainties and delays, will
be necessary to put into effect deci-
sions reached under the agreement.
Some modern statutes, like the
ones in New York and Michigan,
state in detail the circumstances
and the procedure whereby a proxy
can be made irrevocable. In other
jurisdictions, the law has retained
all the uncertainties and subtleties
of the proxy-coupled-with-an-in-
terest concept, the interpretation
of which has resulted in so much
litigation.
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According to the conventional
view, the "interest" which the
proxy holder must have in order
for the proxy to be irrevocable is
either a charge, lien, or some
property right in the shares them-
selves, or a security interest given
to protect the proxy holder for
money advanced or obligations in-
curred. Under this view, a "recog-
nizable property or financial inter-
est in the stock in respect of which
the voting power is to be exer-
cised," which renders the proxy
irrevocable, is said to be distin-
guishable from "an interest in the
corporation generally" and from
"an interest in the bare voting
power or the results to be accom-
plished by the use of it," neither
of which suffices to make a proxy
irrevocable. See In re Chilson,
19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 A. 82
(Ch. 1933). Cf. Smith v. Biggs
Boiler Works Co., 32 Del. Ch.
147, 82 A.2d 372 (Ch. 1951).
Many decisions-perhaps in re-
cent years, most decisions-have
held irrevocable proxies that
would have been revocable under
the traditional concept. See F.
O'Neal, CLOSE CORPORATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE, §5.36 (Calla-
ghan, Chicago, 2d ed. 1971). The
courts have achieved this result
either by departing from the
"coupled with an interest" re-
quirement or by broadening that
concept, sometimes to such an ex-
tent that it is hardly recognizable.
Language in a number of modern
opinions indicates that an irre-
vocable proxy may be sustained if:
* It is supported by consideration
moving from
the maker;
* The proxy
his position
proxy; or
the proxy holder to
holder has changed
in reliance on the
* The proxy was given to further
or protect the interests of the proxy
holder.
The new Michigan statute pro-
vides that a proxy that is entitled
"irrevocable proxy" and states
that it is irrevocable will not be
revocable if it is held by a person
designated by or under a share-
holders' voting agreement, or by
a person who has contracted to
perform services as a director, of-
ficer, or employee of the corpora-
tion, if a proxy is required by his
contract of employment. Mich.
Bus. Corp. Act, §422(d)(f)(1972).
HOLDING COMPANIES
AND PARTNERSHIPS
A group of majority sharehold-
ers in a close corporation can use
a holding company, instead of a
shareholders' voting agreement or
a voting trust, to consolidate their
voting power. In other words, the
holders of a majority of the voting
shares in company A can create
another corporation, company B,
and transfer their A shares to B in
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exchange for shares of B stock.
Thereafter, the shares of A stock
held by company B will be voted
as a unit, pursuant to directions of
B's board of directors or officers.
In a Nebraska case, four share-
holders of a realty company, who
together owned a bare majority of
its stock, set up another company
to hold their shares. The charter
of the holding company provided,
among other things, that it could
not dispose of any stock it held in
the realty company unless it dis-
posed of all of its property, after
approval of holders of at least two-
thirds of its stock. By virtue of this
holding company arrangement, an
individual who held a majority of
the holding company's stock was
able to exercise complete control
over both the holding company and
the realty company, even though
he had been only a minority share-
holder in the realty company. In
an action for a declaratory judg-
ment to define the rights of the two
corporations and their sharehold-
ers, the court sustained the ar-
rangement and permitted the hold-
ing company to vote its shares of
realty company stock. Baum v.
Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197,
62 N.W. 2d 864 (1954).
A holding company can also be
used in lieu of a voting trust
temporarily to divest all, or a
majority of, the shareholders of a
corporation of their voting power
and control. A corporation bor-
rowing money might be required
by a lending institution as a condi-
tion to its advancing funds to the
corporation to set up a holding
company that the lender can con-
trol. The shareholders to be tempo-
rarily disenfranchised would trans-
fer their shares to a limited-life
holding company in return for
nonvoting holding company stock,
while persons who were to acquire
temporary control would purchase
a few shares of holding company
voting stock for a modest sum.
When the holding company's
stated life expired, its nonvoting
shareholders would receive in
liquidation the shares which they
had formerly held in the operating
company.
A holding company has a num-
ber of disadvantages, however,
which will usually prevent its being
used in setting up a control pattern
for a closely held enterprise. In the
first place, the use of a holding
company entails the expense of
organizing and maintaining an
additional corporation. Further,
both the holding company and the
operating company would be dis-
qualified to elect the tax status
provided by Subchapter S, IRC
§ 1371 (a)(2).
Participants in a closely held
corporation sometimes organize a
partnership to hold the shares
representing their interests in the
corporation. Some or all of the
share certificates representing the
ownership of the corporation can
be issued to a partnership com-
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posed of key participants in the
business; and voting of the shares
probably can be controlled by a
provision in the firm's articles of
partnership authorizing, for ex-
ample, a particular partner to vote
the shares, or directing that they
be voted pursuant to the decision
of a majority of the partners. How-
ever, a partnership is seldom used,
perhaps because of uncertainty as
to the validity of a provision in the
articles of partnership controlling
the voting of the shares, or reluc-
tance to enter into a control ar-
rangement that can be terminated
at any time by one of the partners
exercising his right to dissolve the
partnership.
MANAGEMENT CONlA:TS
To be distinguished from con-
trol agreements among some or all
of the shareholders are contracts
executed by the corporation itself
under which its management or the
control over certain aspects of its
operations is entrusted to a cred-
itor or some other individual or
corporation. The contract is usu-
ally referred to as a "management
agreement" when it attempts to
vest the entire management of the
corporation or even considerable
management powers in another
corporation or individual, particu-
larly if a substantial fee is to be
paid for these management ser-
vices.
A distinction also should be
made between management agree-
ments and the common resolutions
under which the directors tempo-
rarily delegate part of their func-
tions to an executive committee or
to corporate officers. An arrange-
ment giving authority to an execu-
tive committee or the corporation's
officers is always subject to the
supervision and overriding juris-
diction of the directors, who can
modify or terminate the preroga-
tive of such a committee or officer
at any time. A management agree-
ment, on the other hand, divests
the board of its functions for the
term provided in the contract.
Judicial opinions dealing with
the validity and effect of manage-
ment agreements and other corpo-
rate contracts that vest control
of a corporation in managers other
than its duly selected directors and
officers are few in number and
rather unsatisfactory. In particular,
there seems to be a tendency in the
decisions to lump together indis-
criminately cases dealing with
management contracts and those
relating to shareholders' agree-
ments. The decisions indicate,
however, that a management con-
tract may be subject to attack on
the following two grounds:
* The contract violates a statute
which provides that the affairs of
a corporation shall be managed by
its board of directors; and
9 The directors of a corporation,
in view of their limited term of
January
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office, do not have the capacity to
enter into long-term contracts that
will bind future boards for long or
indefinite periods on basic policy
or management matters.
Taking the decisions as a whole,
the validity of a contract by which
a corporation vests direction of its
affairs in another person or com-
pany seems to depend upon the
number and importance of the
powers that are delegated, the
length of time for which they are
to be held, and perhaps the pur-
pose of the contract or the situa-
tion out of which it arose.
Management contracts that dele-
gate substantially all manage-
ment decisions to outsiders for
indefinite or extended periods of
time are usually held invalid. Thus,
a court struck down a contract be-
tween two insurance companies
that gave one the "underwriting
and executive management" of the
other for a period of 20 years.
From the terms of the agreement
and the length of time it was to
remain in effect, the court con-
cluded that "not only managerial
powers were delegated, but the
entire policy" of one company was
to be fixed and determined by the
other. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v.
Indiana Mut. Cas. Co., 41 F.2d
588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 893 (1930).
Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Michigan refused to specifically
enforce an agreement by a corpo-
ration giving the purchaser of some
of its five-year convertible bonds
the right to designate a comptroller
for the corporation, and providing
that the comptroller would have
complete charge of all finances of
the company and that no expendi-
tures should be made or authorized
without his prior approval. The
court declared the contract to be
against public policy and thus
unenforceable. Marvin v. Solventol
Chem. Products, Inc., 298 Mich.
296, 298 N.W. 782 (1941).
On the other hand, corporations
have been permitted to delegate to
outsiders, at least for a limited
period, some of the functions usu-
ally performed by their directors
and officers. An agreement em-
ploying an executive and giving
him the position of editor and
manager of a large daily news-
paper with power to determine
editorial policy for a period of five
years was held to be valid. Jones
v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.
353 (1897) (all of the shareholders
and directors approved the con-
tract; in fact, the dissenting judges
viewed it as an agreement of the
individual shareholders rather than
as a corporate contract). Further,
a contract among manufacturing
companies establishing a joint
committee with exclusive authority
to represent the parties in negotia-
tions with employees was sustained
against a claim that it constituted
an unlawful delegation of the dis-
cretionary functions of the direc-
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tors. Dyers Bros. Golden West
Iron Works v. Central Iron Works,
182 Cal. 588, 189 P. 445 (1920).
CONCLUSION
In states that have completely
reworked their corporation acts in
recent years, such as Delaware,
New York, and Michigan, the con-
trol devices discussed here are
clearly sanctioned by statute, and
the procedures to be followed in
using the devices are carefully
spelled out. In those states, a law-
yer can proceed with assurance
that the control patterns he is set-
ting up for a corporation will not
be struck down by the courts.
In other states, useful control
devices, such as high vote require-
ments for shareholder and director
action, are of doubtful validity.
Nevertheless, in spite of an un-
favorable statute, by careful plan-
ning and drafting, the lawyer often
can clarify legal relationships in
areas where the law is uncertain
and provide answers to control
problems that can be anticipated
easily.
Even more important than
clearing up legal ambiguities is the
thoughtful and careful tailoring of
the control devices to the needs of
the particular enterprise being
organized. The control pattern for
a close corporation should be in-
dividually developed. The ideal
control pattern will vary with the
nature and scope of the enter-
prise; the number of persons who
are to participate in it; the con-
tribution in money, credit, and
services that each participant is
to make; and the business skills,
the personalities, and the prefer-
ences of the participants.
The stability of a control pat-
tern, once established, can some-
times be affected by the transfer
of shares, buy-and-sell agreements,
and various types of buy-out ar-
rangements. Furthermore, thought
must be given to provisions for
avoiding dissension, settling dis-
putes, and breaking deadlocks that
may develop in the corporation's
management.
One final word of caution is
necessary. Preoccupation with
achieving a desired control pattern
should not be permitted to result
in an inadvertent loss of important
business, tax, or legal advantages.
Inflexible control arrangements
may make if difficult for an enter-
prise to meet unforeseen contin-
gencies or take advantage of un-
expected opportunities. Further-
more, use of some control devices,
such as classification of shares,
may preclude the corporation's
election of the favorable tax status
authorized by Subchapter S of the
IRC. In other words, the planning
of a close corporation's control
pattern and the drafting of docu-
ments to implement those plans
should not be isolated from other
business and legal decisions that
are being made in establishing an
enterprise.
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